The idea

A robot combines moving parts, stored energy, software and people. Safety means designing the whole system so that foreseeable failures and interactions don’t cause unacceptable harm. The tools are a precise vocabulary (ISO 12100), a way to score risk, and a register to track it.

From hazard to harm

Hazard, hazardous situation, hazardous event, harm

StepMeaningRobot cell example
HazardA potential source of harmA robot arm that can move fast
Hazardous situationSomeone is exposed to itA technician enters the cell to clear a jam
Hazardous eventThe thing that causes harmThe arm moves unexpectedly
HarmInjury or damage to healthA crush injury

A hazard exists whether or not anyone is near it. Keep the four steps separate, because each one is a different place to put a control.

Risk

ISO 12100 splits likelihood into three parts: exposure (how often and how long someone is near), probability of the event, and possibility of avoiding the harm. Reduce any of them and the risk falls.

Same hazard, different risk: a fast robot arm is severity 5 either way. With the operator outside a locked fence, likelihood 1 → risk 5 (low). With a technician teaching it inside the cell at full speed, likelihood 4 → risk 20 (very high). Controls change the risk, not the hazard.

5×5 risk matrix

Score impact on safety, operations and cost separately, and take the highest. Matrices give rankings, not measurements: 1 × 5 and 5 × 1 both score 5 but need very different responses. They support judgement; they don’t replace it.

Where hazards come from

ISO 12100 lists mechanical, electrical, thermal, noise, vibration, radiation, substances, ergonomic and environmental hazards. Robotics adds software and control (unexpected restarts, sensor false negatives) and human–robot interaction (shared spaces, bypassed interlocks, cyber attacks).

Look across the whole life: installation, teaching, operation, maintenance and disposal. Most accidents happen in the non-routine stages, when guards are open and people are inside. Also consider reasonably foreseeable misuse, like reaching past a guard to save time.

Finding risks

Write every risk as cause → event → consequence.

TechniqueHow it works
Checklists, incident dataCompare with known hazards and past accidents
What-if / brainstorming”What if the light curtain fails?”
HAZOPGuide words (no, more, less, reverse…) applied to each function
FMEA (bottom-up)Each component: failure mode → effect → cause
Fault tree (top-down)From the accident down to causes, through AND/OR gates
STPAUnsafe control actions in a whole system

The process

Determine the limits → identify hazards → estimate risk → evaluate (acceptable?) → reduce → loop back and check for new hazards. It’s a cycle, kept alive in a risk register with an owner for each risk, reviewed after incidents, changes and near misses.

Register columns: ID · description · cause · likelihood · impact · score · action · control level · residual risk

Controls

Always start at the top of the hierarchy of controls, whatever the score (see Designing for safety). The score sets how urgently you act, not which controls you’re allowed to skip. Controls usually reduce likelihood; severity only drops if the design changes (e.g. limiting a cobot’s force).

When it went wrong

CaseThe failure
Ford Flat Rock, 1979First recorded robot death: no warning or safeguard
Kawasaki, 1981Interlock bypassed during maintenance, robot still powered
Therac-25, 1985–87Hardware interlocks replaced by buggy software
Uber, Arizona, 2018Pedestrian not classified, emergency braking disabled, safety driver distracted
Ocado warehouse, 2021Robots collided, causing a battery fire

Check yourself